Employment Discrimination Law—Title VII and Same-Sex Sexual Harassment—Closing the Great Divide: What to do in a Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Case. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). by Overman, Tracey Williams
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 21 Issue 2 Article 7 
1999 
Employment Discrimination Law—Title VII and Same-Sex Sexual 
Harassment—Closing the Great Divide: What to do in a Same-Sex 
Sexual Harassment Case. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). 
Tracey Williams Overman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tracey Williams Overman, Employment Discrimination Law—Title VII and Same-Sex Sexual 
Harassment—Closing the Great Divide: What to do in a Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Case. Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998)., 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 323 (1999). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss2/7 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW-TITLE VII AND SAME-SEX
SEXUAL HARASSMENT--CLOSING THE GREAT DIVIDE: WHAT TO DO IN A
SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,' the United States
Supreme Court decided that same-sex sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination; it then held that sex discrimination comprised of same-sex
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.2 The decision ended a division among lower courts regarding this issue
Part II of this note examines the facts related to the Oncale decision. Part
I reviews the legislative history regarding Title VII's inclusion of discrimina-
tion "because of... sex," and it analyzes the United States Supreme Court's
recognition of sexual harassment as a category of sex discrimination under
Title VII, noting that sexual harassment law grew out of racial harassment law.
Part ImI also discusses the two general types of sexual harassment claims under
Title V1I--hostile environment and quid pro quo--and it examines three
different positions circuit and district courts have taken regarding the
actionability of same-sex sexual harassment claims in the last few years.4 After
evaluating the Court's reasoning in Part IV, this note considers the significance
and future implications of the Oncale decision in Part V.
II. FACTS
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 to eliminate
employment discrimination. 6 Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminat-
ing against an employee based on the employee's sex, among other statuses.
7
1. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
2. See id. at 1003.
3. See Corey Taylor, Comment Same-Sex Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Under
Title VII: The Legal Dilemma and the Tenth Circuit Solution, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 305, 314-19
(1998).
4. The author acknowledges that in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct.
2257, 2265 (1998), the United States Supreme Court stated that although they are not irrelevant
to Title VII litigation, the labels quid pro quo and hostile work environment are not controlling
for purposes of establishing employer liability under Title VII. Ellerth was decided over three
months after Oncale, and while it modified Oncale, Ellerth did not overrule Oncale nor
diminish the importance of the Oncale decision in the area of sexual harassment/sex
discrimination law.
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-532, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 255
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994)).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), (a)(2) (1994).
7. See id. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
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The United States Supreme Court has held that Title VII's protection against
employment discrimination based on sex encompasses sexual harassment
claims. In 1997, the United States Supreme Court faced a major issue
regarding Title VII--whether sex discrimination comprised of same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable under the statutory language and provisions of Title
VII. 9
The Court considered the case of Joseph Oncale (Oncale), who, in
October of 1991, worked as a roustabout on an oil platform for Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc. (Sundowner).' 0 He was a member of an eight-man
crew." Three of Oncale's co-workers, including his supervisor, subjected
Oncale to a series of sex-related incidents. 12 Although he complained to the oil
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." Id. Note that courts construe "sex" in the most narrow form of the word, referring only
to discrimination on the basis of gender, not to sexuality or sexual preference such as
homosexuality. See generally DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-330 (9th
Cir. 1979).
8. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) ; see also Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines state that sexual harassment in the workplace is a violation of Title VII. See 29
C.F.R. § 1604.1 ](a) (1993). Specifically, the guidelines state that "[u]nwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment .... See id. at § 1604.11 (a)(1).
9. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
10. See id. at 1000. One amicus brief writer described the job on the oil platform as a
"dangerous, isolated job in an all-male environment." See Amicus Brief, Brief of National
Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc. at 2, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568). A roustabout holds the lowest ranking position on
an oil platform. See Brief for Respondent at 1, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118
S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568). Oncale got the job through Sundowner's Houma, Louisiana,
office. See Brief for Petitioner at 4 n. 1, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct.
998 (1998) (No. 96-568).
11. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001. The eight-man crew included the platform's crane
operator, John Lyons (Lyons), the platform's driller, Danny Pippen (Pippen), and Brandon
Johnson (Johnson), a co-worker. See id. Lyons and Pippen had supervisory authority. See id.
The crew worked offshore seven days at a time during which time they lived on one offshore
platform and worked on another nearby oil platform. See Brief for Respondent at 1, Oncale
(No. 96-568).
12. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001. In the first and second incidents, which occurred on
October 25 and 26, 1991, respectively, Lyons placed his penis on Oncale's head and arm. To
facilitate Lyons's actions, Pippen restrained Oncale in the first incident, and Johnson restrained
him in the second. See Brief for Respondent at 1-2, Oncale (No. 96-568). In the third incident,
which occurred the night of October 26, 1991, Lyons and Pippen entered the shower with
Oncale, and Lyons rubbed a bar of soap between Oncale's buttocks while Pippen again
restrained Oncale. See id. at 2. During the first and third incidents, Lyons was saying that he
was going to "f*** [Oncale] in [his] behind." See id. at 1-2.
[Vol. 21
SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
platform's supervisory personnel, the company took no remedial action. 3 He
eventually quit his job on the oil platform.'4
Oncale filed a complaint against Sundowner, alleging that the employer
discriminated against him in his employment because of his sex in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ' Sundowner argued that the conduct
Oncale experienced constituted sexually charged male-on-male horseplay, not
sex-based discrimination, as shown by the fact that Lyons picked on other
crew-members.' 6 Relying on the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Garcia v. ElfAtochem North America,'7 the District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana granted summary judgment for Sundowner 8 On appeal,
a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision.' 9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
the Fifth Circuit, holding that sex discrimination comprised of same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII.
20
III. BACKGROUND
This section first discusses the legislative history of Title VII's inclusion
of discrimination "because of ... sex." Second, it examines the Court's
recognition of sexual harassment as a category of sex discrimination, noting
that sexual harassment law grew out of racial harassment law. It also reviews
the two general theories of sexual harassment. Third, this section analyzes the
13. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001. Oncale reported the harassment to the company's
Safety Compliance Clerk, Valent Hohen. See id. Hohen told Oncale that Lyons and Pippen
continuously picked on him as well, and called him a name suggesting homosexuality. See id.
Hohen was Sundowner's highest ranking representative on the job site. See Brief for Petitioner
at 4-5, Oncale (No. 96-568).
14. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001. Oncale resigned on November 10, 1991, after Lyons
reprimanded him for taking a smoking break without Lyons's permission; Lyons told Oncale
he was going to "run him off." See Brief for Respondent at 3, Oncale (No. 96-568). Oncale's
pink slip reflected his reason for leaving as "voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and verbal
abuse." See id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 6). At his deposition, Oncale stated that he left
because he felt that "if [he] didn't leave [his] job, that [he] would be raped or forced to have
sex." See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
15. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001; see also supra note 7 for pertinent language of Title
VII.
16. See Brief for Respondent at 3, 33, Oncale (No. 96-568).
17. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
18. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., No. Civ. A. 94-1483, 1995 WL
133349 (E.D. La. 1995), aff'd 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996). Relying on Garcia, the district
court stated it was "compelled to find that Mr. Oncale, a male, ha[d] no cause of action under
Title VII for harassment by male co- workers." See id. at *2.
19. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd,
118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
20. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001-03.
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division among the lower courts regarding the actionability of a same-sex
sexual harassment claims under Title VII prior to the Oncale decision. This
analysis begins with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision to extend
Title VII's protection to same-sex sexual harassment cases only where the
harasser is homosexual. It then examines both the Fifth Circuit's categorical
rule barring same-sex sexual harassment claims from Title VII's coverage, as
set out in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, and the Seventh Circuit's
rejection of that approach.
A. Legislative History Regarding the Inclusion of Discrimination "because
of... sex"
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a prohibi-
tion against discrimination based on sex and other statuses.2' By its actual
terms, Title VII prohibits only sex discrimination; it does not mention sexual
harassment.22 An opponent of Title VII added "sex" to the bill the day before
it was approved, apparently in an attempt to ensure the bill's defeat. 2 Congress
included sex as a provision under Title VII with little or no debate, research,
or discussion.2 4  Courts were therefore left with little to guide them in
interpreting Congress' intent in prohibiting discrimination because of sex.25
But despite the absence of legislative intent and no mention of sexual
21. See supra note 6 for pertinent language of Title VII.
22. See Susan Perissinotto Woodhouse, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: Is
It Sex Discrimination Under Title VII?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1147, 1152 (1996).
23. See Ellen Frankel Paul, Overview: Civil Rights in the 1990s-Title VII and
Employment Discrimination, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm,
8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333, 346 (1990); Joanna P. L. Mangum, Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of
America, Inc.: The Fourth Circuit's "Simple Logic" of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under
Title VII, 76 N.C. L. REv. 306, 316 (1997); see also WILLAM F. PEPPER & FLORYNCE R.
KENNEDY, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 18 (1981).
24. See PEPPER & KENNEDY, supra note 23, at 18.
Why 'sex' was added to the bill at the last minute remains puzzling .... Regardless
of what happened.., the bill passed with 'sex' included, but without any clear
expression of congressional intent; thus, the provision opened the door to massive
litigation as the courts attempted to develop a doctrine of sex discrimination on their
own.
Mangum, supra note 23, at 316-17.
25. See Paul, supra note 23, at 346.
In all likelihood, the members of that Congress would have been quite surprised to
learn that they had contemplated including sexual harassment within the confines
of sex discrimination .... They were fashioning a civil rights law... one
addressing impediments to individuals as a result of discriminatory acts - not a law
proscribing just any kind of oppressive act that one person might commit against
another.
Paul, supra note 23, at 346.
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harassment in Title VII itself, the United States Supreme Court judicially
recognized sexual harassment as a classification of sex discrimination in
1986.26
B. Recognition of Sexual Harassment Claims under Title VII, and Two
General Theories of Sexual Harassment
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,27 the Supreme Court held, for
the first time, that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that falls
under the protection of Title VII.21 Specifically, the Meritor Court approved
the hostile environment theory of sexual harassment, which is one form of
sexual harassment.29 It is important to note that sexual harassment law grew
out of racial harassment law.30 As the Meritor Court noted, the Fifth Circuit,
in Rogers v. EEOC,3' a racial harassment case, was apparently the first court
to recognize a cause of action based upon a hostile, abusive working environ-
ment.32
In Rogers, a female Hispanic employee filed suit against her employer
pursuant to Title VII, alleging that her employer had discriminated against her
because of her national origin by creating an offensive working environment.33
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately held that the employee could
establish a Title VII violation by showing that her employer created a
discriminatory and offensive working environment by giving Hispanic clientele
discriminatory service.34 In reaching this decision, the court explained that
26. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986); see also Woodhouse,
supra note 22, at 1152 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986)).
27. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
28. See id. at 73; but see Michelle Ridgeway Peirce, Note, Sexual Harassment and Title
VII-A Better Solution, 30 B.C. L. REv. 1071, 1092 (1989) (stating that the judicial expansion
of Title VII to sexual harassment is improper. "Based on Title VI's legislative history, it is
clear that Congress gave little or no thought to the inclusion of 'sex' in the statute, much less
to 'sexual harassment.' Congress intended to equalize job opportunities, not regulate sexual
activity in the workplace."); Paul, supra note 23, at 364 (stating that a new tort of sexual
harassment, as opposed to Title VII, could offer "a more propitious remedy" for unwelcome
sexual advances in the workplace, and elsewhere).
29. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
30. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal.
v. St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977); see also Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football
Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977).
31. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
32. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-66.




Title VII is an expansive concept, reaching beyond mere economic aspects of
employment.35
In Meritor, Mechelle Vinson brought a claim against Meritor Savings
Bank and her supervisor claiming that her supervisor subjected her to constant
sexual harassment.36 Vinson specifically claimed that while she initially
refused her supervisor's suggestion that she go to a motel with him, she later
gave in to the requests for fear of losing her job.37 Vinson argued that
unwelcome sexual advances that create a hostile working environment violate
Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. a The United States Supreme
Court agreed with Vinson, thereby aligning itself with the Rogers court and
aligning sexual harassment law with racial harassment law.39
In reaching its decision, the Court noted, as the Rogers court had already
discussed, the expansive nature of Title VII that allowed the statute to cover
hostile environment sexual harassment. 40 The Court then set out the test for
determining what constituted actionable hostile environment sexual harass-
ment.4' The Court also looked to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Henson v.
City of Dundee.42 Focusing on a former police dispatcher's claim that her
supervisor created a hostile working environment in violation of Title VII, the
35. See id. at 238. The court stated:
[E]mployees' psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily entitled to
protection from employer abuse, and the phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment' in [Title VII] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged
with ethnic or racial discrimination. One can readily envision working
environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the
emotional and psychological stability of minority workers ....
Id. But the court recognized that not all workplace conduct constitutes harassment that affects
a "term, condition, or privilege of employment" within Title VII's meaning, stating that "it [did]
not wish to be interpreted as holding that an employer's mere utterance of an ethnic or racial
epithet which engenders offensive feelings in the employee" falls under Title VI's protection.
See id.
36. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59.
37. Seeid. at 60.
38. See id. at 64.
39. See id. at 66. "A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that
discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." Id.
40. See id. at 65-66. The Court also noted that the EEOC guidelines issued in 1980
recognized sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination, and that those guidelines
recognized that sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances. See id. at 65.
41. See id. at 67. "For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's employment] and create an abusive work
environment." Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir.
1982)). Further, the Court stated that the "gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the
alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome."' See id. at 68 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)
(1985)).
42. 682 F.2d 897 (1 th Cir. 1982).
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Henson court stated that sexual harassment composed of an abusive working
environment barred sexual equality in the workplace in the same way racial
harassment barred racial equality.43
In the 1993 case Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.," the Supreme Court
elaborated upon its decision in Meritor. In Harris, the Court held that
determining whether a working environment is hostile or abusive requires
consideration of the totality of the circumstances, not just any one factor.4 5 The
Harris Court also recognized that the threshold issue presented by a sexual
harassment case is whether the plaintiff was harassed because of his or her
sex.4 The plaintiff need not suffer psychological injury from the harassment;
instead, the harassment must be objectively and subjectively abusive or
hostile. 7 In this way, the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a
category of sex discrimination under Title VII, explicitly recognizing hostile
environment harassment as one theory of sexual harassment.
The second generally recognized theory of sexual harassment is the quid
pro quo theory. Under this type of sexual harassment, a term of the
employment is conditioned upon the employee's submission to unwelcome
sexual advances. 49 A plaintiff alleging quid pro quo harassment must prove
five things.50 Most courts have broadened Title VII's coverage beyond sexual
harassment claims between females and males and have recognized same-sex
sexual harassment under the quid pro quo theory; but courts were split on
whether Title VII should encompass same-sex hostile environment sexual
43. See id. at 902.
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of
one sex is every bit the barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial
harassment is to racial equality. Surely a requirement that a man or woman run a
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and
make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest racial epithets.
Id.
44. 510 U.S. 17(1993).
45. See id. at 23.
46. See id. at 22; see also Taylor, supra note 3, at 319. "In reviewing same-sex sexual
harassment cases, it appears that the main obstacle to establishing a Title VII hostile
environment cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment is proving that the victim was
harassed because of his or her sex." Taylor, supra note 3, at 319.
47. SeeHarris, 510U.S. at22.
48. See generally Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1982).
49. Seeid. at910.
50. See id. at 909. First, he or she must prove he belongs to a protected class; second, that
he or she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances; third, that the harassment complained
of was based on sex; fourth, that his or her reaction to the harassment affected tangible aspects
of his employment; and fifth, respondeat superior. See id. Recently, however, the Supreme
Court held that there is no requirement for a tangible job detriment in order to bring a sexual
harassment claim under Title VII. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
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harassment claims.5' District and circuit courts, when confronted with the
actionability of same-sex hostile environment sexual harassment claims under
Title VII, have taken a variety of positions, leading to much confusion and a
great division on the subject.
2
C. Division Among the Lower Courts
1. Recognition of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims, But Only
Where the Harasser is Homosexual
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether Title VII covers
situations in which both the victim and the harasser are of the same sex in
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors.3 McWilliams began
working for Fairfax County Equipment Management Transportation Agency
as an automotive mechanic in 1987. 54 Beginning in 1989, several of
McWilliams's co-workers began taunting him, asking him about his sexual
activities.55
Based on Title VII, McWilliams ultimately brought a hostile environment
sexual harassment claim against the county.5 6 The Fourth Circuit court held
explicitly that Title VII did not apply in heterosexual male-on-male (same-sex)
sexual harassment cases.57 The Fourth Circuit made this decision without
extensive discussion or analysis.58 It simply stated that to extend Title VII to
protecting conduct in which only heterosexual males are involved would
overextend the statute. 9
51. See Woodhouse, supra note 22, at 1158; see also Taylor, supra note 3, at 310-11.
Many same-sex sexual harassment cases dealing only with males have involved the quid pro
quo form of sexual harassment and only a "select few" involve the less common hostile
environment form. See Woodhouse, supra note 22, at 1158.
52. See Amy Shahan, Comment, Determining Whether Title VII Provides a Cause of
Action for Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 507, 512-23 (1996) (discussing
the dilemma in district courts in determining whether same-sex sexual harassment is actionable
under Title VII).
53. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
54. See id. at 1193.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 1194.
57. See id. at 1195.
58. See id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned, summarily, that McWilliams's hostile
environment claim failed "for the more fundamental reason that such a claim does not lie where
both the alleged harassers and the victim are heterosexuals of the same sex... and (there was]
no claim made that any [of the parties] was homosexual." See id. The court then stated that
while perhaps there '"ought to be a law against' such puerile and repulsive workplace behavior
even when it involves only heterosexual workers of the same sex... Title VII is not that law."
See id. at 1196.
59. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96. The Court said that to extend Title VII to
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In the same year it decided McWilliams, the Fourth Circuit addressed
another same-sex sexual harassment case in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut ofAmerica,
Inc.6 Unlike in McWilliams, Wrightson dealt with openly homosexual
harassers.6' The District Court for the Western District of North Carolina,
Charlotte Division, dismissed Wrightson's complaint.62 The Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court ruling and explicitly held, as it had only suggested
in McWilliams, that Title VII encompassed a same-sex hostile work
environment sexual harassment claim, but only where the harasser was a
homosexual.63
2. Categorical Rule Barring Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims in
the Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Context-Garcia v. Elf
Atochem North America
The Fifth Circuit established a categorical rule barring a same-sex sexual
harassment claim in the hostile environment context in Garcia v. ElfAtochem
North America.64 The Fifth Circuit relied on its 1993 decision in Giddens v.
Shell Oil Co.65 In that case, the court held that no cause of action existed under
Title VII for same-sex sexual harassment.'
heterosexual same-sex sexual harassment would lead to "unmanageably broad protection of the
sensibilities of workers simply 'in matters of sex."' See id. The Fourth Circuit's decision in
McWilliams leads to the problem of a plaintiff attempting to prove that his aggressor is
homosexual, which might be impossible to do and might lead to much unnecessary
embarrassment. See Shahan, supra note 52, at 517-18.
60. 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
61. See id. at 139.
62. See id. at 141. In dismissing the complaint, the district court relied on the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Garcia v. ElfAtochem North America (holding that same-sex sexual
harassment is not actionable under Title VII). See infra note 64, at 451-52.
63. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 141, 143. "Simple logic" guided the Fourth Circuit in its
decision. See id. at 142. "As a matter of both textual interpretation and simple logic, an
employer of either sex can discriminate against his or her employees of the same sex because
of their sex, just as he or she may discriminate against employees of the opposite sex because
of their sex." Id.; see also Susan Silberman Blasi, The Adjudication of Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Claims Under Title VII, 12 LABOR LAW. 291 (1996). There are two types of same-
sex sexual harassment cases: 1) sexual orientation cases wherein the plaintiff tries to bootstrap
sexual orientation protection under the sex discrimination of Title VII, and 2) true actions of
sexual harassment in which the victim and harasser are of the same sex. See id. at 308. Title
VII does not cover the first type of harassment case, only the second. See id. at 308-09.
64. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994). See Woodhouse, supra note 22 (arguing that courts
should follow Garcia and hold that same-sex sexual harassment is not actionable under Title
VII because "[s]uch harassment is not the type of conduct that sexual harassment law meant to
deter").
65. No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished).
66. See id. Specifically, the Giddens court stated that "[h]arassment by a male supervisor
against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment
1999]
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The court also relied on the district court's decision in Goluszek v. Smith.67
The district court in that case held that Title VII did not protect an employee
against same-sex sexual harassment where no evidence of an anti-male
environment existed.68 In reaching this decision, the court noted the limited
scope of Title VII, asserting that Title VII protected against abuse of power
against another less powerful person. 69 But not all commentators agreed with
the Garcia and Goluszek holdings.70 One scholar enumerated five specific
reasons why same-sex sexual harassment claims should be actionable under
Title VI.7"
3. Finding Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Actionable-Doe v. City of
Belleville, Illinois
In Doe v. City of Belleville, Illinois,72 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
explicitly rejected the narrow interpretation of Title VII given in the Garcia
and Goluszek decisions. 73 Doe involved two sixteen-year-old male twins, H.
and J. Doe, who were subjected to a relentless campaign of harassment by their
has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender discrimination." See id.
67. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. I11. 1988).
68. See id. at 1456.
69. See id. Title VII "does not make all forms of harassment actionable, nor does it even
make all forms of verbal harassment with sexual overtones actionable. The 'sexual harassment'
that is actionable... 'is the exploitation of a powerful position to impose sexual demands or
pressures on an unwilling but less powerful person."' See id. (quoting Note, Sexual Harassment
Claims ofAbusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1449, 1451 (1984));
see also Shahan, supra note 52, at 527 (arguing that in the same-sex sexual harassment context,
"the power involved is not exclusively within the realm of gender," and the "only power
involved may be that of sheer force of manipulation," which should be enough to support a
Title VII claim based on an imbalance of power).
70. See Lisa Wehren, Note, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VII." Garcia v.
Elf Atochem Marks a Step in the Wrong Direction, 32 CAL. W. L. REV. 87 (1995). "When
determining whether the conduct involved in a sexual harassment claim is based on gender,
courts should not look to the respective gender of the harasser and the victim. The gender of
the harasser with respect to the victim is irrelevant .... Id. at 122-23; see also Trish K.
Murphy, Note & Comment Without Distinction: Recognizing Coverage of Same-Gender Sexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1125 (1995).
71. See Blasi, supra note 63, at 317-18. Same-sex sexual harassment claims should be
actionable under Title VII for five reasons: 1) public policy demands it; 2) the rationale for
sexual harassment claims under Title VII is to give relief to people who have received
demeaning treatment on the job, and this applies to males and females, heterosexuals and
homosexuals; 3) same-sex sexual harassment is not discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and therefore is covered by Title VII; 4) courts that have denied same-sex sexual
harassment victims claims under Title VII have done so based on flawed reasoning; and 5)
allowing same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII will not bring any undesirable
effects. See Blasi, supra note 63, at 317-18.
72. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).
73. See id. at 574.
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male coworkers while employed to cut weeds and grass in the municipal
cemetery for the City of Belleville, Illinois, in 1992. 74
The court noted that, although sexual harassment usually involved a male
harassing a female, in a previous decision, it had suggested that same-sex
sexual harassment could be actionable in appropriate situations.75 While it
agreed with the Goluszek court that the historic imbalance of power between
men and women in the workplace powerfully illustrated why harassment by a
male superior over a female should be regarded as sex discrimination, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the Goluszek ruling that Title VII excluded from its
coverage men who were sexually harassed by other men.76
Ultimately, according to the court, the plain, unambiguous language of
Title VII suggested that anyone discriminated against because of his or her sex
may bring suit, regardless of his gender or the harasser's gender.77 The Doe
court stated that the rule that same-sex sexual harassment was actionable 6nly
when the harasser was homosexual was wrong.78
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,79 a unanimous United
States Supreme Court held that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.0 In addition, the Court determined that recognizing liability for same-
gender sexual harassment under Title VII would not convert the statute into a
general code of behavior for the American workplace." This section will
74. See id. at 566.
75. See id. (quoting, as dicta, its decision in Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428,
430 (7th Cir. 1995)).
76. See id. at 572. In rejecting Goluszek on this point, the court stated that "[t]he language
of Title VII ... does not purport to limit who may bring suit based on the sex of either the
harasser or the person harassed." See id.
77. See id. at 573. According to the court, "unless we read into the statute limitations that
have no foundation in the broad, gender-neutral language that Congress employed, it is evident
that anyone sexually harassed can pursue a claim under Title VII, no matter what her gender or
that of her harasser." See id. at 574.
78. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 574-75. The court stated that it had never made the viability of
sexual harassment claims dependent upon the sexual orientation of the harasser, and that it
would be "both unwise and improper to begin doing so. Fears that if such a requirement is not
imposed, commonplace 'horseplay' will give rise to sexual harassment claims ...are
unfounded." See id. "We are not, as it turns out, incapable of distinguishing between the
occasional off-color joke, stray remark.. . ." Id. at 591.
79. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
80. See id. at 1003.
81. See id. at 1002-03. Sundowner argued that "[t]o hold that cases involving same-
gender sexually harassing conduct are actionable under Title VII as discrimination because of
gender simply because of the sexual content of the conduct would write the 'because of sex'
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analyze the Court's opinion that Title VII does not establish a categorical rule
against same-sex sexual harassment claims. It will also outline the Court's
reasoning that recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will not transform
Title VII into a general civility code. Finally, this section will note the brief
concurring opinion in Oncale.
A. Unanimous Opinion
The Court began its substantive discussion by outlining the Court's
precedents regarding Title VH. 82 Quoting the relevant language of Title VII,83
the Court first noted the prior holding of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson" that Title VII is a broad prohibition against all disparate treatment of
men and women in the workplace.85 The Court then noted its decision in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 6 that hostile environment discrimination
violates Title VII.87 The Court looked further at its Title VII precedents and
asserted its prior holding that Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination
applies to both men and women.88
The Court also cited its recognition in Castaneda v. Partida89 that an
employer might discriminate against members of his own race. 90 Finally, the
Court discussed its decision in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County.9' In Johnson, the Court rejected a male employee's claim that he was
discriminated against because of his sex when his supervisor promoted a
female employee over him, but the Court did not find it relevant that the
supervisor who made the decision was also a male.92 Based on these
precedents, and to clear any confusion they created, the Court held that nothing
language out of the statute," thereby converting the statute into an artificial "generalized
workplace tort statute." See Brief for Respondent at 16, Oncale (No. 96-568).
82. SeeOncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
83. See supra note 7 for the pertinent language of Title VII.
84. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
85. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001. Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination "not
only covers 'terms' and 'conditions' in the narrow contractural sense, but 'evinces a
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women
in employment."' See id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
86. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that Title VII is violated when the workplace is
"permeated" with insult and intimidation that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive" to "alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment").
87. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
88. See id. (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
682 (1983)).
89. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
90. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
91. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
92. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
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in Title VII conclusively bars a claim of discrimination "because of... sex"
simply because the harassed and the alleged harasser are both males or both
females.
93
The Court enumerated three different positions state and federal courts
have taken regarding the applicability of Title VII to sex discrimination claims
in the context of hostile environment sexual harassment.94 The first stance the
Court cited, the Fifth Circuit's position in this case, was that same-sex sexual
harassment claims are never actionable under Title VII. 95 The Court explicitly
rejected the Fifth Circuit's categorical rule barring a discrimination claim under
Title VII where the plaintiff and defendant are of the same sex.9 In rejecting
this position, the Court reasoned that while male-on-male sexual harassment
in employment was not the primary evil Congress was concerned with when
it enacted Title VII, statutory provisions often cover evils similar to, yet
beyond, the primary evil the statute targeted.
97
The second stance the Court reviewed was that same-sex sexual
harassment claims are cognizable under Title VII, but only if the complaining
party can prove that the alleged harasser is homosexual and thus presumably
motivated by sexual desire.9 8 The Court also rejected this position, stating that
sexual desire need not motivate the harassing conduct in order to support an
inference of discrimination based on sex. 99
The third stance the Court identified was that sexual harassment in the
workplace is always actionable under Title VII regardless of the alleged
harasser's gender, sexual orientation, or motivations. 0 The Supreme Court
93. See id. at 1001-02. "If [its] precedents [left] any doubt on the question... nothing in
Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of. . . sex' merely because the
plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf of the defendant) are
of the same sex." Id.
94. See id. at 1002. The Court stated that while courts have largely accepted the theory
of same-sex discrimination where an employee is passed over for a job or promotion, when the
issue arises in the "hostile environment" sexual harassment context, courts have split on the
issue and taken a "bewildering variety of stances." See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. The Court saw "no justification in the statutory language or [its] precedents
for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII."
See id. If the plaintiff can prove he was discriminated against because of his sex and that the
discrimination has altered the terms or conditions of his employment, that claim is actionable
under Title VII. See id.
97. See id. The Court noted that statutory provisions "often go beyond the principal evil
to cover reasonably comparable evils," and "it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather
than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed." See id.
98. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (citing McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of
Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996) in comparison with Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am.,
99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996)).
99. See id.
100. See id. (citing Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997) as representative
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adopted the third approach here. " Ultimately, the Court concluded that Title
VII's prohibition against discrimination because of sex must encompass all
kinds of sexual harassment that meet the statutory requirements, and this can
include same-sex sexual harassment.1
0 2
In the final part of its opinion, the Court addressed Sundowner's
argument10 3 that employer liability for same-sex sexual harassment would
transform Title VII into a general code of behavior for the American
workplace.0' The Court gave three specific reasons why this alleged
transformation would not occur. 0 5 First, the Court focused on Title VIl's
requirement that the alleged workplace discrimination was in fact because of
the plaintiff's sex.' 6 Holding that the critical issue in Title VII cases was
whether the discrimination was "because of ... sex,"'0 7 the Court held that
courts and juries could reasonably infer sex discrimination where the plaintiff
and defendant are of the same gender. 8 This inference could occur, the Court
held, because under the statute, the sexually-harassing conduct does not have
to be driven by the harasser's sexual desire;'0 9 the conduct must actually
constitute discrimination because of sex."0 The Court stated, then, that one
of this stance).
101. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
102. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
103. See Brief for Respondent at 5, 16-18, Oncale (No. 96-568). Sundowner argued that
Oncale was trying to have the Court expand Title VII to cover same-gender harassment with
sexual overtones where no evidence of discrimination because of sex exists. See id.
104. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002-03.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 1002. The Court reasoned that Title VII prohibits only discrimination
"because of... sex", not all workplace harassment, and that the Court has "never held that
workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is automatically
discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or
connotations." See id.
107. See id. "The critical issue, Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex
are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed." Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 372 (1993)
(Ginsburg, J, concurring)).
108. See id. The Court reasoned that a jury might "reasonably find" sex discrimination if,
for example, a female is harassed in "such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another woman
as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of women
in the workplace." See id.
109. See id. The Court noted:
Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to draw in most
male-female sexual harassment situations .... The same chain of inference would
be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex harassment if there were credible
evidence that the harasser was homosexual. But the harassing conduct need not be
motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of
sex.
Id.
110. See supra note 7 for pertinent language of Title VII.
[Vol. 21
SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
requirement that would prevent recognizing liability for same-sex harassment
from transforming Title VII into a mere civility code for the workplace is the
statute's detailed requirement that the alleged harassment must actually denote
discrimination "because of... sex.""'
Second, the Court noted the alleged expansion of Title VII into a general
civility code would not occur because the statute is narrow in scope." 2 It
covers only objectively offensive behavior.13 This objectively offensive
conduct requirement, the Court held, serves as the third requirement of Title
VII that would prevent the alleged transformation."4 The Court said this third
requirement was vital in differentiating simple same-gender horseplay from
sexual harassment." 5 The objective gravity of the harassment should be
determined from the perspective of a reasonable person in a situation similar
to the plaintiffs under the totality of the circumstances."
6
According to the Court, the proper inquiry in a same-sex sexual
harassment case, as in all harassment cases, requires careful reflection on the
social context in which the alleged offensive conduct occurred." 7 The Court
held that common sense and an appropriate sensitivity to the social context in
which the behavior occurred and was experienced by the victim would guide
I 11. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. "Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to
follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with
offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted "discrimina[tion] ... because of...
sex." Id. (emphasis added).
112. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003. Title VII does not cover the "genuine but innocuous
differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and
of the opposite sex .... [I]t forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the
'conditions' of the victim's employment." See id.
113. See id. "Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile
or abusive work environment- an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive- is beyond Title VII's purview." Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct.
367, 371 (1993)).
114. See id.
115. See id. Specifically, the Court noted that it has always regarded the objectively
offensive requirement of Title VII "as crucial, and as sufficient to ensure that courts and juries
do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace- such as male-on-male horseplay or
intersexual flirtation- for discriminatory 'conditions of employment."' See id.
116. See id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993)).
117. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003. The Court used the example of a professional football
player, noting that:
A professional football player's working environment is not severely or pervasively
abusive ... if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field- even
if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's
secretary (male or female) back at the office. The real social impact of workplace
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation
of the words used or the physical acts performed.
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courts and juries in this inquiry.' 18 These two things would allow courts and
juries to differentiate between simple teasing or roughhousing among males or
females and conduct that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's place would
regard as severely abusive or hostile. 9
Based on the Court's Title VII precedents and its reasoning that liability
for same-sex sexual harassment would not transform or expand Title VII into
a general civility code, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that Title
VII covers same-sex sexual harassment claims. 120
B. Justice Thomas's Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas, writing individually, expressed his support for the Court's
opinion for one reason- because the Court emphasized Title VII's requirement
that the same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff must prove that the actions
against him or her constituted discrimination because of sex.1
21
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Oncale is a milestone decision in the area of sexual harassment sex
discrimination law.'2 One of the most obvious effects of this decision will be
that male same-sex sexual harassment victims can bring a claim under Title
VII. Before the Oncale decision, these victims labored against a male-
dominated society and received little or no protection under Title VII.'
23




121. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring). "I concur because the Court
stresses that in every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title
ViI's statutory requirement that there be discrimination 'because of... sex."' Id. Interestingly,
in 1991, in "the first [sexual harassment] case to receive widespread public attention," Anita
Hill brought charges of sexual harassment against then United States Supreme Court Justice
nominee Clarence Thomas; at that time, Hill was a young, novice lawyer, and Thomas was her
supervisor at the Department of Education and subsequent Chair of the EEOC. See Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1692 (1998).
122. See Marc S. Spindelman & John Stoltenbert, Amicus Brief Introduction, Oncale:
Exposing "Manhood," 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 3 (1997). As these scholars noted, the Oncale
case, once decided, would be "landmark" in the "understanding of sexual harassment as a form
of sex discrimination." See id. at 6. They further stated that if the Supreme Court failed to find
same-sex sexual harassment actionable under Title VII, it would "tacitly condone men's
assaultive and sexualized humiliations of other men - often concealed within all-male preserves
(such as boarding schools, street gangs, fraternities, and locker rooms)." See id.
123. See id. Spindelman and Stoltenbert noted that in the years before Oncale, male




the actionability of same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII.
12 4
Oncale is also significant because it reiterates the key to any sex discrimination
or sexual harassment case-that the alleged harassment occurred because of the
plaintiffs sex.1
25
In addition, the Court's decision in Oncale settles the debate about
whether the alleged harassment must be sexual in nature. 26 Before this
decision, courts distinguished between hostile work environment cases
involving sexual innuendo and those cases involving gender discrimination. 1
27
The Harris decision left the issue of what constitutes actionable conduct
open.128 Most courts, however, have held that the harassing conduct need not
contain sexual innuendo to be actionable.129 For example, in McKinney v.
Dole, 30  the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
distinguished between harassing conduct involving sexual overtones and other
sexually harassing conduct, holding that any kind of harassment that would not
have occurred but for the employee's gender, whether comprised of sexual
overtones or not, was actionable under the provisions of Title VII.L3' Clearly,
124. See supra Part III.C for the various positions that lower courts took regarding the
actionability of same-sex sexual harassment claims under Title VII.
125. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
126. See generally Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count as Terms, Conditions,
or Privileges of Employment under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REv. 643, 673-76 (1996). "The
classic sexual harassment hostile work environment case involves sexual innuendo or sexually
explicit materials." Id. at 673.
127. See id. Hostile work environment cases involving what has been termed "gender
discrimination" denote cases in which an employee "is simply treated poorly because of her
sex." See id. (citing Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990); Hall
v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013-14 (8th Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833
F.3d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987), among other cases, as referring to this type of "gender
discrimination" sexual harassment hostile work environment situation). "It is not clear, at first,
whether hostile environment cases should be extended to the latter variety of cases; those in
which the plaintiffs were subjected to mistreatment (though not of a sexually connotative
nature) because of their sex." Id.
128. See id.; see also Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg
stated that the "critical issue.., is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." See
id.
129. See Beiner, supra note 126, at 674. Instead of requiring the harassing conduct to have
sexual overtones, one court stated that "conduct of a nonsexual nature that ridicules women or
treats them as inferior can constitute prohibited sexual harassment." See Beiner, supra note
126, at 674 (quoting Cronin v. United Serv. Stations, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 922, 929 (M.D. Ala.
1992)).
130. 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
131. See id. at 1138. The court made the distinction as such:
We have never held that sexual harassment or other unequal treatment of an
employee or group of employees that occurs because of the sex of the employee
must, to be illegal under Title VII, take the form of sexual advances or of other
incidents with clearly sexual overtones. And we decline to do so now. Rather, we
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after the Court's decision in Oncale, the alleged harassment need not be sexual
in nature to be actionable.1
32
Perhaps even more significant is the question Oncale leaves
unanswered-whether the alleged harassing conduct is judged from the
perspective of the reasonable person or the reasonable victim.'33 In Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc.,' M the Supreme Court discussed the actionability of
harassing conduct from the perspective of the reasonable person.
35
In Ellison v. Brady, 36 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the
reasonable victim of the same gender standard in determining whether
harassment had occurred, thereby replacing the sex-blind standard of the
reasonable person.'37 The court believed that the reasonable person standard
tended to be male-biased and ignored women's experiences. 38 The Michigan
Supreme Court, in Radtke v. Everett,3 9 rejected the reasonable victim of the
same gender standard set out in Ellison and thereby created a debate between
the Harris reasonable person standard and the Ellison reasonable victim of the
hold that any harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or group of
employees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may,
if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment
under Title VII.
Id.; see also Beiner, supra note 126, at 674-75 (discussing the McKinney case in the context of
"reindeer games" as a source of unequal treatment of an employee).
132. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. The Court explicitly stated that its holding that Title
VII's prohibition against "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex" includes sexual harassment
"must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements." See id.
Even though the harassing conduct directed at Joseph Oncale contained sexual innuendos, this
language does not require or even suggest that the harassment must be "sexual" in nature to be
actionable under Title VII. See id.
133. See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993).
134. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
135. See id. at 21. "Conduct that.., a reasonable person would [not] find hostile or
abusive - is beyond Title VII's purview." Id.
136. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
137. See id. at 879. Specifically, the court held that "a female (or male) plaintiff states a
prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment when she (or he) alleges conduct
which a reasonable woman (or man) would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment." See id. (parentheticals
added).
138. See id.; see also Nancy Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology
of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1207 (1990) (stating that
men tend to view some types of sexual harassment as "harmless social interactions to which
only overly-sensitive women would objecf'); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the
Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1203 (1989) (noting that the
male view of sexual harassment characteristically depicts it as "comparatively harmless
amusement").
139. 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993).
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same gender standard.' 40 The Oncale decision, because of the Court's careful
skirt around this issue, does little to settle this debate.14 ' Therefore, while the
Court in Oncale resolved some issues relating to sexual harassment sex
discrimination, at least one major issue in this area remains unsettled, meaning
that confusion surrounding sexual harassment law persists. Whether the Court
will finally address this unresolved issue in a later case remains to be
determined.
In two decisions subsequent to Oncale, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton'42
and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,143 both decided on June 26, 1998, the
Supreme Court settled three important issues in the area of sexual harassment
law under Title VII. First, the Court stated that the scope of Title VII extends
beyond tangible or economic discrimination; this means that there is no
requirement for a tangible job detriment, such as discharge or demotion, in
order to establish a sexual harassment claim under Title VII. 44 Second, the
Court held that an employer is subject to vicarious liability to a sexually
harassed employee victim for actions of a supervisor that create an actionable
hostile working environment. 45  Third, the Court held that an employer
defending against an actionable sexual harassment claim may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages when no tangible employment
action is taken against the victimized employee.' 4 Two necessary elements
140. See id. at 166. In rejecting the reasonable victim standard, the court stated that "the
reasonable person standard should be utilized because it is sufficiently flexible to incorporate
gender differences . . [T]he reasonable person standard has been carefully crafted to
formulate one standard of conduct for society." See id.
141. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003. In discussing the careful consideration of the social
context in which the particular behavior occurred and was experienced by its target, the Court
stated that a coach's pat on the buttocks of a professional football player does not constitute a
hostile work environment, "even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as
abusive by the coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office." See id. The careful use
of the parenthetical "male or female" allows the Court to dodge answering this issue once again,
because it leaves open the door for the reasonable person standard and the reasonable victim of
the same gender standard.
142. No. 97-282, 1998 WL 336322 (U.S. June 26, 1998).
143. No. 97-569, 1998 WL 336326 (U.S. June 26, 1998).
144. See Faragher, 1998 WL 336322 at *8. Specifically, the Court recognized that
"although the statute [Title VII] mentions specific employment decisions with immediate
consequences, the scope of the prohibition 'is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible'
discrimination."' See id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993)); see also
Burlington, 1998 WL 336326 at * 16 (holding that "[a]lthough [the plaintiff] has not alleged she
suffered a tangible employment action.., this is not dispositive").
145. See Faragher, 1998 WL 336322 at *19; Burlington, 1998 WL 336326 at *15. Using
the same language in both cases, the Supreme Court held that "[a]n employer is subject to
vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by
a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee." See id.
146. See Faragher, 1998 WL 336322 at *19; Burlington, 1998 WL 336326 at *15. The
Court, in each case, noted that the affirmative defense is "subject to proof by a preponderance
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make up the affirmative defense.'47 The Court further stated, however, that
when the supervisor's harassment ends in a tangible job detriment, such as
termination or receiving an undesirable reassignment, no affirmative defense
is available to the employer. 148 Oncale, therefore, is one of several major
Supreme Court decisions pertaining to sexual harassment claims under Title
VII, and each new decision sheds light on this ever important area of the law.
Tracey Williams Overman
of the evidence." See id.
147. See Faragher, 1998 WL 336322 at *19; Burlington, 1998 WL 336326 at *15.
According to the Supreme Court, the two "necessary elements" comprising the defense are:
(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that an employer had
promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in
every instance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the
employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case when
litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed
to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited
to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the
employer's burden under the second element of the defense.
1d.
148. See Faragher, 1998 WL 336322 at *19; see also Burlington, 1998 WL 336326 at *15.
Specifically, the Court stated that "[n]o affirmative defense is available ...when the
supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment." See id.
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